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USE TAX COLLECTION JURISDICTION: RETAIL STORES ON
A STATE BORDER HELD HOSTAGE
Good's Furniture House, Inc. v. Iowa State Board
of Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145 (Iowa
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 76 (1986)
INTRODUCTION
An increasingly debated issue in the courts is the extent to which a
state can impose use tax' collection responsibilities upon out-of-state sell-
ers which sell to residents within the taxing jurisdiction. At the center of
this controversy is a classic conflict inherent in our federal system-
namely, the state's power to tax and raise revenues, balanced against the
constraints placed upon this power by the commerce 2 and due process 3
clauses of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court, in a consistent line of cases, 4 has established
the Constitutional parameters necessary for a state to require an out-of-
state retailer to act as its use tax collection agent. According to the
Court, State A cannot require a retailer located in State B to collect the
State A use tax unless that retailer has a sufficient nexus, or connection,
with State A. 5 The Supreme Court has found a sufficient nexus to exist
only where the out-of-state retailer had some physical presence in the
taxing state, as evidenced, for example, by retail outlets or sales solicitors
in the taxing state.6
State tax administrators, not content with the Supreme Court's
1. Use taxes are generally levied against the purchaser for use, consumption or storage of
tangible personal property within a taxing jurisdiction. For example, a typical use tax situation
occurs when the Jones', residents of State A, go to a furniture store in nearby State B, to buy a
couch, which will be delivered via the furniture store's own truck. In this situation, State A cannot
require State B to collect its sales tax because the transaction did not occur in State A. A sales tax,
as applied to an out-of-state transaction was held to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1944).
Instead, State A imposes a use tax on the Jones' use of the couch in State A. The imposition of
a use tax in the Jones scenario is constitutional because a use tax is a levy on the enjoyment of an
item, after commerce is at an end, and, therefore, does not contravene the commerce clause. See
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581-82 (1937). However, now State A is faced with the
impractibility of collecting use taxes from a multitude of purchasers. State A, to remedy this prob-
lem, has imposed a seller collection system, and wants the State B furniture retailer to collect its tax.
See, e.g., the discussion in P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL. TAXATION
§ 10:8, at 618-19 (1981).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See infra Historical Background section for a complete discussion.
5. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't. of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
6. Id.
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physical presence standard, argue that their tax bases have been eroded
and state coffers deprived of much needed revenues7 by the states' inabil-
ity to reach interstate mail order retailers and border store8 sellers. Gen-
erally, these retailers have no contacts with the taxing jurisdiction other
than solicitation of in-state residents by mail and other forms of advertis-
ing. The problem, administrators contend, promises to be even more
acute in the very near future given the increasingly sophisticated meth-
ods of advertising. For example, cable television, toll-free "800" tele-
phone numbers, and computerized shopping services have enabled
businesses to solicit customers at greater distances and with fewer physi-
cal contacts9 than ever before. 10 In response, states have attempted to
expand use tax collection jurisdiction to extra-territorial retailers which
do little more than advertise in the forum state by passing new nexus
laws' '-a seemingly unconstitutional expansion of state taxing power. 12
7. A recently completed study by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(hereinafter "ACIR") estimates that the states are losing $1.4 to $1.5 billion annually by not being
able to impose collection responsibilities on out-of-state retailers. ACIR, STATE AND LOCAL TAXA-
TION OF OUT-OF-STATE MAIL ORDER SALES 11 (April 1986). The Supreme Court long ago judi-
cially recognized the revenue needs of states. Justice Jackson noted that "[in the last twenty years,
revenue needs have come to exceed the demands that legislatures feel it expedient to make upon
accumulated wealth or property with fixed location within the state. The states therefore have
turned to taxing activities connected with the movement of commerce." Miller Bros. Co. v. Mary-
land, 347 U.S. 340, 342-43 (1954). See also Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 442 (1940).
8. Border store sellers as used herein refers to retailers with a place of business located close to
the boundary of a neighboring state. A border store seller located in State B typically sells to resi-
dents of State A tax-free because the seller is not registered to do business in State A (the taxing
state).
9. The term "physical contacts" as used here should not be confused with minimum contacts
in the Constitutional sense. Rather, physical contacts is used here in its literal sense, meaning that
the retailer/solicitor has no presence, other than its advertising, in the taxing state.
10. See, e.g., Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Mod-
ern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 424-25 (1976); Address by Matthew J. Coyle, Deputy Director
Washington Department of Revenue, to the National Association of Tax Administrators (June 18,
1984).
11. For an overview of the new nexus laws, see Dlouhy, The Debate Over the Constitutionality
of the New Nexus Laws: The Legal Issues and the Arguments 1-2 (unpublished outline).
12. An increasing number of states are amending their use tax statutes to specifically provide
that advertising constitutes a sufficient nexus for imposition of use tax collection responsibilities on
out-of-state retailers. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6015.5 (West 1987) (enacted in 1985)
(amends the law by adding a section which defines any broadcaster, printer, publisher, etc. which
carries advertising to consumers in California, including advertising in a California edition of a na-
tional publication, as an "agent of the person or entity placing the advertisement" and defines the
person or entity placing the ad as a "retailer engaged in business" in California, and, thus, required
to collect and remit sales tax); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2702(21)(d) (Supp. 1987) (enacted in 1987)
(amends the definition of retailer engaged in business to include retailers that continuously, regu-
larly, or systematically advertise from an in-state transmitter or distribution point); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 57-39.2-01, 57-40.2-01 (Supp. 1987) (expands the definition of retailer to include every
person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of North Dakota consumers by various
forms of advertising); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1354.2-1354.6 (West supp. 1987) (enacted in
1987) (provides that continuous, regular, or systematic solicitation in the Oklahoma consumer mar-
ket by out-of-state vendors through advertisements is a sufficient nexus for imposition of collection
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In Good's Furniture House, Inc. v. Iowa State Board of Tax Re-
view, 13 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of that
State's imposition of use tax collection responsibilities upon an Illinois
border retailer whose only contact with Iowa was incidental general ad-
vertising and occasional deliveries via company owned truck. Part I of
this comment will review the historical background underlying the impo-
sition of use tax collection responsibilities on out-of-state retailers. Part
II will examine the facts of Good's Furniture, and describe the court's
reasoning. Then, in Part III, this case comment will focus on the Iowa
court's seemingly expansive interpretation of Supreme Court precedent
and the substantial negative effect of its decision on the multitude of
small, independent border store retailers, which, as a result of the Iowa
court's opinion, will now be required to act as use tax collection agents.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The use tax has mainly developed as a means of complementing the
sales tax; it is used to reach those transactions occurring outside state
boundaries, where a sales tax cannot constitutionally be imposed. 14 The
imposition of a use tax thus protects sales tax revenues by putting local
retailers on a competitive level with out-of-state retailers which are ex-
empt from sales tax when selling to residents in the taxing state., 5 The
legal incidence of a use tax is upon the in-state user or consumer.16 It is
impractical, however, for a taxing jurisdiction to identify and tax the
multitude of purchasers that buy goods out-of-state, for use within the
taxing state. To remedy this problem, state laws generally require out-of-
state retailers to collect the use tax and remit the tax collected to the
taxing state.17 There can be no question today that a state has the power
liabilities); Substitute H.B. 231, 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-506, 5-618 (Baldwin) (effective Oct. 5,
1987) (amends Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01 to provide that nexus exists when the seller "con-
ducts a continuing pattern of advertising" in Ohio to solicit purchases of the seller's goods or
services).
13. 382 N.W.2d 145 (Iowa 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 76 (1986).
14. P. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 578. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)
the Supreme Court sustained the Washington use tax. The Court concluded that the use tax, unlike
a sales tax on out-of-state purchases, did not exceed commerce clause limitations. The Court ex-
plained that the use tax was a tax on the privilege of use, after commerce was at an end. Id. at 581-
82. Subsequently, the Supreme Court distinguished the sales tax from the use tax as follows:
A sales tax and a use tax in many instances bring about the same result. But they are
different in conception, are assessments upon different transactions, and ... may have to
justify themselves on different constitutional grounds. A sales tax is a tax on the freedom
of purchase ... [a] use tax is a tax on the enjoyment of that which was purchased.
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
15. National Geographic Soc'y. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555 (1977).
16. P. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 578.
17. Id. at 619.
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to require an out-of-state seller to collect the state use tax, providing the
constitutional tests described below are met. t8
A state, in order to deputize an extra-territorial vendor as its collec-
tion agent, must meet both Constitutional due process and commerce
clause limitations imposed on the exercise of state power. Due process
requires that the out-of-state seller have minimum contacts 19 with the
state seeking to compel collection of its use tax. 20 In Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney Co. ,21 the Supreme Court formulated the test that has been used
to determine whether a state's imposition of tax collection responsibilities
on an out-of-state seller passed due process muster. The Court specified
that the "test is whether ... the taxing power exerted by the state bears
fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.
The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given any-
thing for which it can ask return. '22 The test with respect to commerce
clause limitations on imposition of a use tax collection duty on extra-
state sellers is similar. That clause prevents a state from imposing taxes
that unduly burden interstate commerce. Thus, according to the
Supreme Court in Freeman v. Hewit,23 taxes falling on interstate com-
merce can only be justified when there is a relationship between the tax
imposed and the cost of local government protection afforded the out-of-
state seller. The primary focus, then, under either the due process or the
commerce clause, is on determining whether the out-of-state seller has
derived a sufficient benefit from the taxing jurisdiction to justify imposi-
tion of a duty to collect use tax.
Accordingly, when examining the constitutionality of imposing a
use tax collection duty, the relevant legal inquiry is whether there is a
sufficient nexus, 24 or connection, between the extra-territorial vendor and
18. Id. See also National Geographic Soc'y., 430 U.S. at 551, 555; Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 93 (1934).
19. Minimum contacts, as used here, should not be confused with the minimum contacts re-
quired for in personam jurisdiction.
20. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
21. 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). Even though the J.C. Penney case involved imposition of a tax
"for the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends" out of income derived from in-state property
and business, the Supreme Court has applied the J.C. Penney test in use tax collection cases. See,
e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Dep't. of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967).
22. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444.
23. 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946). The Freeman commerce clause test was applied to the use tax
collection jurisdiction issue in National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
24. When the taxing state seeks to compel an out-of-state vendor to collect its tax, it is imposing
its administrative, or collection jurisdiction, as opposed to its taxing jurisdiction, where the state
seeks to impose a tax directly. The Supreme Court has clearly distinguished collection jurisdiction
from tax jurisdiction, and has held that a lower nexus standard is required in the former situation.
See, e.g., National Geographic Soc'y., 430 U.S. at 560, where the out-of-state retailer argued that a
nexus was required between the seller and the taxing state and between the activity of the seller upon
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the taxing state to deputize the vendor as a collection agent. As will be
seen from the cases in Sections A and B, below, the Supreme Court has
invoked the due process and the commerce clauses interchangeably 25 in
making the nexus determination, and in delineating the constitutional
boundaries, beyond which a state cannot extend its use tax collection
jurisdiction.
A. Sufficient Nexus to Impose Collection Jurisdiction
All of the use tax collection jurisdiction cases decided by the
Supreme Court have turned upon whether there was a sufficient connec-
tion, or nexus, between the taxing jurisdiction and the out-of-state seller
to justify imposition of collection responsibilities. One of the earliest rul-
ings26 addressing this issue was Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 27 Sears,
which had twelve retail stores in Iowa, argued that imposing use tax col-
lection responsibilities with regard to its separately administered and dis-
tinct mail order business would contravene the due process and
commerce clauses. Sears contended that the requisite nexus requirement
for satisfying the two clauses was lacking because its local retail stores
did not generate the mail order sales. Rather, the mail order sales were
accepted and filled out-of-state. 28
The Court, addressing both the due process and the commerce
which a tax was to be imposed, and the seller's activity within the taxing state. The Court disagreed,
stating that "[h]owever fatal to a direct tax a 'showing that particular transactions are dissociated
from the local business . . .' such dissociation does not bar the imposition of the use-tax-collection
duty." Id. (citations omitted). Compare General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335
(1944) with McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). Both cases were decided the same
day. In the former case, the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of use tax collection responsibili-
ties on an out-of-state vendor; whereas in the latter case, the Court held that, in an identical fact
situation, the taxing state could not impose a sales tax directly on the extra-state retailer.
25. A debate currently exists as to whether the use tax collection jurisdiction issue should be
resolved by reference to either the due process or the commerce clause. That constitutional debate is
not the focus of this comment. Rather, the focus of this comment is on the business ramifications of
use tax collection jurisdiction, as it is being expanded by the states under the new nexus laws. Thus,
it is taken as an accepted fact that a certain nexus is constitutionally required, regardless of whether
the due process or the commerce clause is the basis for challenging a state's imposition of collection
duties on an extraterritorial retailer. See, e.g., Loar, Use Tax Jurisdiction: Why Not a Unified Nexus
Standard, I Am. J. Tax Pol'y. 119 (1982); McCray, Commerce Clause Sanctions Against Taxation on
Mail Order Sales: A Re-evaluation, 17 Urb. Law. 529 (1985); McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due
Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 265.
26. The Supreme Court actually addressed the sales-use tax jurisdiction issue in one earlier
case, Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1938). However, the line of cases beginning
with Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941), establishes the current parameters for
determining whether a state imposition of a duty to collect use tax contravenes constitutional limita-
tions. Moreover, Sears was the first case addressing mail order selling schemes, a selling arrange-
ment similar to the border store situation discussed herein.
27. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
28. Id. at 365.
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clause concerns, 29 applied a physical presence standard to uphold Iowa's
assertion of use tax jurisdiction. The presence of Sears retail stores in
Iowa provided a sufficient connection with the taxing state to justify the
imposition of use tax collection responsibilities on Sears. 30 Justice Doug-
las, speaking for the majority, reasoned that Sears' mail order business
was part of its aggregate business activity in Iowa. Thus, the taxing state
was entitled to make the out-of-state retailer its collection agent "as a
price of enjoying the full benefits flowing from the Iowa business." '31
Subsequent cases have expanded state use tax jurisdiction over ex-
tra-territorial sellers, but have maintained the physical presence standard
for nexus. For example, in General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commis-
sion,32 solicitation of orders by General Trading's traveling salesmen
within the taxing state was found to provide a sufficient nexus for imposi-
tion of collection duties.
Similarly, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,33 the Court affirmed a Georgia
retailer's duty to collect the Florida use tax. In that case, the retailer's
only connection with Florida was the use of ten in-state jobbers who
solicited orders from Florida customers. Scripto argued that these job-
bers were independent contractors, not employees, and that Scripto
therefore lacked the requisite connection with Florida to be deputized as
a collection agent. 34 The Court found the distinction between "em-
ployee" and "independent contractor" to be without constitutional sig-
nificance. Although the Court did not specifically mention the due
process clause, its holding addressed due process concerns. Also, the
Court dismissed the commerce clause as a basis for rejecting Florida's
imposition of use tax collection responsibilities on the Georgia retailer.
Of primary importance to the Scripto Court was the nature and extent of
the Georgia retailer's activities in Florida.35
29. Id. at 364-65.
30. Id. at 364.
31. Id. See also, Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 373 (1941) (companion
case to Sears). The Court noted an additional factor present in this case, compelling the imposition
of tax collection duties on the retailer. Namely, that Ward advertised locally, not only retail mer-
chandise, but catalog merchandise as well. The Court interpreted the local advertisements as an
indication that Ward had solicited mail order sales in Iowa. However, this case must be distin-
guished from that in Good's Furniture, where the advertisements did not originate locally, but rather
out-of-state.
32. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
33. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
34. Id. at 209. Scripto thus attempted to distinguish its relational connection with the state
from that in General Trading. Also, the National Bellas Hess Court described the Scripto decision as
the "furthest constitutional reach to date of a State's power to deputize an out-of-state retailer as-its
collection agent for a use tax." National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757.
35. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 211-12.
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In the most recent case to address the use tax jurisdiction issue, Na-
tional Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization,36 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Sears. The National Geographic
Society maintained two advertising offices in California which were unre-
lated to its out-of-state mail order business. Nonetheless, the Court,
without specifying the due process or commerce clause as the basis for its
decision, found that the National Geographic Society's continuous pres-
ence in California provided a sufficient nexus to justify imposition of a
collection duty. Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion, rejected the
Society's argument that in addition to a "physical" nexus between the
seller and the taxing state, an "activity" nexus was also required between
the activity the state sought to tax, and the seller's activity within the
state.
37
As the above cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has found a suffi-
cient nexus to constitutionally validate a state's assertion of use tax juris-
diction only where the out-of-state seller had a physical presence, as
manifested by property, salesmen, agents, or independent contractors, in
the taxing state.
B. Insufficient Nexus to Collect Use Tax
The Court has drawn the line in situations where an extra-territorial
seller lacked a physical presence in the forum state. Two cases evidence
the outermost limits to which a taxing state can stretch its use tax juris-
diction. The first case is Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland.38 Miller
Brothers, a Delaware furniture retailer, sold merchandise directly to cus-
tomers at its store in Delaware, which was located close to the Maryland
border. The store did not accept any mail or telephone orders, nor did it
make any solicitation of customers other than by Delaware newspaper
and radio advertisements, and occasional direct mail advertising to for-
mer customers. Residents of nearby Maryland purchased merchandise
at the store, which they either carried home or which was delivered to
them by common carrier or by the store's own truck. 39
Maryland sought to assert use tax jurisdiction over Miller Brothers
on the basis that the physical presence nexus test was satisfied by
(1) Miller Brothers' newspaper and radio advertisements which,
although not directed at Maryland residents, were known to reach them;
and (2) the fact that Miller Brothers made occasional deliveries into
36. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
37. Id. at 560.
38. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
39. Id. at 341.
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Maryland via company-owned trucks. 4° The Court, relying on the due
process clause,4' held that neither element afforded the state a connection
with the seller sufficient to create a collector's liability. Primary empha-
sis was placed on the fact that the incidental effects of general advertising
evidenced "no invasion or exploitation of the consumer market."'42 The
Miller Brothers Court, in an often cited passage, defined the use tax juris-
dictional nexus test as follows: "[T]he course of decisions does reflect at
least consistent adherence to one time honored concept: that due process
requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."'4 3 None of the
requisite links or connections were satisfied by the Maryland taxing
scheme as applied to Miller Brothers.
The second case limiting the reach of a state's long "use tax jurisdic-
tional" arm was National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Illinois Department of Reve-
nue.44 There, the state revenue agency met with defeat when it tried to
require collection of its use tax by a Missouri-based catalog company-
National Bellas Hess. The company's only connections with customers
in the market state were solicitation by mail and subsequent deliveries to
Illinois residents via mail or common carrier. The retailer had no prop-
erty or sales outlets in Illinois nor representatives, solicitors, or agents in
that state.4 5
The majority in National Bellas Hess stressed that in order to up-
hold the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens, it would have to
repudiate the sharp distinction 46 made in previous cases between retail
sellers with a physical presence in the taxing forum, and those without
any presence other than mere communication by mail or common car-
rier.47 This the Court declined to do. Justice Stewart, in delivering the
opinion of the Court, based his decision on the commerce clause,
although due process concerns were addressed in an ancillary fashion.
Of primary importance to the Court was the fear that serious restraints
on interstate commerce would result from a decision upholding use tax
jurisdiction. The Court specifically mentioned the burdensome conse-
40. Id. at 341-42.
41. See the Court's discussion id. at 344-45. Having determined that the Maryland tax contra-
vened the due process clause, the Court did not address the commerce clause issue. Id. at 347.
42. Id. at 347.
43. Id. at 344-45.
44. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
45. Id. at 754.
46. Id. at 758.
47. In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Fortas asserted that the "physical presence" test
for nexus was adequately established by National Bellas Hess' large-scale, systematic, continuous
solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market. Id. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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quences of forcing out-of-state retailers to comply with a myriad of tax-
ing jurisdictions, varying tax rates, differing allowable exemptions, and
entangling administrative and record-keeping requirements. 48
II. FACTS OF THE CASE AND REASONING OF THE COURT
Good's Furniture House (hereinafter "Good's Furniture") was an
Illinois retailer of furniture, carpeting and drapes, with its principal place
of business at its retail store in Kewanee, Illinois.49 The store was located
approximately 55 miles east of the Iowa-Illinois border.50 Iowa residents
came to Good's Furniture and made purchases, some of which they car-
ried away, and some of which were delivered via Good's Furniture
truck.5' No saleschecks or order blanks were completed in Iowa.52
Good's Furniture had no retail stores, warehouses or other business
property in Iowa, nor did the retailer have any sales agents or representa-
tives in Iowa.53 The business' advertising consisted primarily of televi-
sion spots aired on Illinois stations which, although not directed at Iowa
residents, crossed that state's borders and were viewed by Iowans. Occa-
sionally, Good's Furniture advertised on a television station in Daven-
port, Iowa.54  It was determined that approximately ten percent of
Good's Furniture's retail sales during the period April 1, 1977, through
March 31, 1982, were to Iowa residents. 55
The Iowa Department of Revenue found that Good's Furniture's
activities in Iowa warranted assessment of a use tax against the furniture
retailer, covering the five year period in question. 56  Good's Furniture
paid the tax under protest and filed a claim for refund, which the Depart-
ment denied. 57 Subsequently, the Iowa State Board of Tax Review up-
held the denial of the refund claim and a state trial court affirmed.
Good's Furniture then appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.5 8
48. Id. at 759.
49. Good's Furniture House, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145, 146 (Iowa
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 76 (1986).
50. Id. at 146.
51. Id. at 146-47.
52. Appellant's Brief at 4, Good's Furniture v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145
(Iowa 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 76 (1986).
53. Appellant's Brief at 5. Good's Furniture did make occasional deliveries into Iowa. Thus,
the company, at various times had delivery trucks and representatives in that State. However, these
contacts were not enough to satisfy the constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 347 (1954).
54. Appellant's Brief at 4.
55. Appellant's Brief at 5.
56. Good's Furniture, 382 N.W.2d at 147.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Good's Furniture challenged the assessment of the use tax imposed
pursuant to Iowa's use tax statute59 as violative of its constitutional right
to due process.60 The retailer contended that it had insufficient contacts
with Iowa to provide the requisite nexus for use tax collection jurisdic-
tion. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed and held that Good's Furni-
ture had sufficient contacts with the state to allow imposition of the
requirements of Iowa's use tax statute without violating constitutional
limits. 61
The Iowa Supreme Court, in addressing the due process concerns,
first noted that Good's Furniture had relied primarily on the Supreme
Court holding in Miller Brothers.62 The court asserted that more recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court had eroded that holding.63
To support this proposition the court cited Scripto,64 National Bellas
Hess,65 and National Geographic Society.66 In each case, the court noted
that the Miller Brothers nexus test 67 was applied; with regard to Scripto
and National Geographic Society, the minimum contacts were sufficient
to justify imposition of use tax collection responsibility. 68
The court concluded that Good's Furniture likewise had sufficient
contacts with Iowa to justify imposition of use tax liability. 69 The court
reasoned that the Miller Brothers nexus test, refined by later Supreme
Court cases, was satisfied by the following facts: (1) Good's Furniture
directly solicited a large volume of Iowa sales by intensive television ad-
59. Section 423 of the Iowa code provides in relevant part:
§ 423.9 Every retailer maintaining a place of business in this state and making sales of
tangible personal property for use in this state ... shall at the time of making such sales,
whether within or without the state, collect the tax imposed by this chapter from the
purchaser.
§ 423.1(5) "Retailer" ... includes ... any salesmen, representatives, truckers ... as the
agents of the dealers, distributors ... under whom they operate or from whom they obtain
tangible personal property sold by them . . . the director may so regard them and may
regard the dealers, distributors ... as retailers.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 423.1(5), 423.9 (West Supp. 1986).
60. Good's Furniture also contended that (1) it was not a retailer within the meaning of that
term under the Iowa statute and (2) the department should be estopped from assessing use tax
because department representatives earlier had informed it that the tax need not be collected. Good's
Furniture, 382 N.W.2d at 147, 150.
61. Id. at 150.
62. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 340; see also supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
63. Good's Furniture, 382 N.W.2d at 149.
64. Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207. See also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
65. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753. See also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
66. National Geographic Soc'y., 430 U.S. at 551. See also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying
text.
67. To satisfy due process there must be "some definite link, some minimum connection be-
tween a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax." Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 344-
45.
68. Good's Furniture, 382 N.W.2d at 149.
69. Id. at 150.
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vertising, and (2) it regularly serviced its Iowa customers by delivering
merchandise in employee-driven, company-owned trucks. 70  Signifi-
cantly, the Good's Furniture court never distinguished the factual setting
in Miller Brothers.
Finally, the court bolstered its holding by stating that "[o]ther state
court decisions are in accord with our conclusion on this due process
issue."' 71 The court cited three rulings from other jurisdictions in support
of this conclusion. 72
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Physical Presence Standard
The Iowa Supreme Court is one of a growing number of state
courts73 that have exceeded the seemingly clear limitations upon use tax
jurisdiction enunciated in a consistent74 line of Supreme Court decisions.
According to those decisions, in order for a state to impose tax collection
duties upon an extra-territorial retailer, there must be a sufficient connec-
tion, or nexus, between the out-of-state seller and the taxing jurisdiction
to pass constitutional challenge. In determining whether a sufficient
nexus exists, the Court has adopted a physical presence test 75 whereby a
state cannot extend its taxing arm to an out-of-state seller unless that
seller has either retail outlets, solicitors or property within the taxing
state.
76
The limitation placed upon use tax collection jurisdiction by the
physical presence test conforms with the doctrinal requirements underly-
ing both the commerce clause and the due process clause of the Four-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The state cases cited by the court each held that a sufficient nexus existed to support imposi-
tion of use tax collection responsibilities upon out-of-state retailers, under facts similar to those in
the instant case. See Cooey-Bentz Co. v. Lindley, 66 Ohio St. 2d 54, 419 N.E.2d 1087 (1981) (seller
directed advertising at consumers in the market state, regularly serviced customers in that state, and
could easily identify the destination of goods sold); In re Webber Furniture, 290 N.W.2d 865 (S.D.
1980) (seller made regular deliveries in its own truck into the taxing state); Rowe-Genereux, Inc. v.
Vermont Dep't. of Taxes, 138 Vt. 130, 411 A.2d 1345 (1980) (seller made deliveries into Vermont in
its own truck, did local advertising in Vermont, and performed some installation work in the taxing
state).
73. See cases cited supra note 72.
74. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area have, at times, been characterized as inconsis-
tent. This label can be attributed to Justice Jackson's statement in his opinion for the Miller Bros.
Court that -[n]or are all of our pronouncements during the experimental period of this type of
taxation consistent or reconcilable." 347 U.S. at 344. Nonetheless, the Miller Bros. decision and its
progeny form a clear basis for establishing the constitutional limitations upon use tax jurisdiction.
75. The Supreme Court has never actually labeled its test. However, this is a convenient and
accurate short-hand term for describing the nexus standard in use tax jurisdiction cases.
76. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
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teenth Amendment. For example, in Freeman v. Hewit, the Court stated
that the commerce clause "created an area of trade free from interference
by the States ... State taxation falling on interstate commerce can only
be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the
cost of local government whose protection it enjoys." ' 77 Thus, the Na-
tional Bellas Hess Court, in reasoning that imposition of a use tax collec-
tion responsibility could only be justified on commerce clause grounds if
the out-of-state seller had a physical presence in the taxing state, 78 con-
cluded that anything short of a physical presence would impose an undue
burden on the extra-state mail order house by forcing it to comply with a
myriad of local and state taxing schemes.
It is significant that the National Bellas Hess Court for the first time
considered the burden of compliance costs as an integral part of the com-
merce clause analysis in use tax jurisdiction cases. 79 Since National Bel-
las Hess lacked a physical presence in Illinois, the costs imposed would
have had no legitimate tie to the company's fair share of the cost of local
government. 80
Similarly, in determining whether due process clause concerns are
met, the "simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
77. 329 U.S. 249, 252-53 (1946). See also, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
sota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959); Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948).
78. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 757-58. The majority, in adopting the physical presence
test, refused to accept the test put forth by the dissenting justices; namely, whether the out-of-state
retailer was engaged in exploiting the "local" market on a large-scale, systematic and continuous
basis. See id. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting). In other words, the National Bellas Hess Court
repudiated the business presence standard. See the discussion infra at Section B, The Business Pres-
ence Standard..
79. Justice Stewart, speaking for the National Bellas Hess majority, stated that "[I]f the power
of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were upheld, the. resulting impediments upon the
free conduct of its interstate business would be neither imaginary nor remote." Id. at 759. It is
interesting to note that at the time National Bellas Hess was decided, local sales taxes were imposed
by approximately 2,300 localities. Id. at 759 n.12. Today, there is an estimated 6500 state and local
taxing jurisdictions. ACIR, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF OUT-OF-STATE MAIL ORDER SALES
11 (April 1986). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the compliance burdens now would be
greatly magnified. Some may argue, on the contrary, that the technological progress in data process-
ing equipment has lessened the cost of compliance. However, small independent border store retail-
ers, the very target of state tax administrators, often do not have the sophisticated systems of larger
corporations. In fact, the ACIR study confirms that compliance costs for small firms are much
greater than for large retailers. Id. at 6, 48-49.
80. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760. Further, a substantial compliance cost burden was
being placed on the out-of-state seller that was not being borne by intrastate retailers. A burden
posed on interstate commerce which intrastate commerce does not bear clearly contravenes the com-
merce clause. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 48 (1940). The inter-
state-intrastate "equality of burdens" theme is not satisfied by a mere showing that local trade is
taxed at the same rate as interstate trade. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 254. Thus, in National Bellas Hess,
the burden on the mail order house to comply with the myriad of taxing schemes was clearly seen to
be an excessive burden on interstate commerce.
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anything for which it can ask in return."'" Where an out-of-state retailer
has a physical presence within the taxing jurisdiction, this requirement is
easily met.8 2 For example, the presence of the retailer within the taxing
jurisdiction means that it is accorded the benefit of local public services,
such as fire and police protection.
In sum, the physical presence test serves an important dual constitu-
tional function. When an out-of-state retailer has a physical presence in
the taxing jurisdiction, the benefits derived from that relationship satisfy
due process requirements. Additionally, the standard-by factoring
compliance costs into the commerce clause analysis-ensures that a state
does not unduly burden interstate commerce. Where an extra-territorial
seller has no physical presence in a taxing forum, the high costs of com-
pliance, and the resulting burden on interstate commerce, will outweigh
the state's need for imposing use tax jurisdiction.8 3
B. The Business Presence Standard
In effect, the Good's Furniture court ignored the physical presence
standard and instead adopted a standard which I will refer to as the
"business presence" test for determining whether an adequate basis ex-
isted for extension of use tax collection jurisdiction to an extra-territorial
retailer.84 The Iowa court erroneously viewed Scripto and National Geo-
graphic Society has having eroded the physical presence standard, rather
than viewing the factual situations in those cases as simply failing to meet
the test clearly evidenced from Sears and its progeny.85
The business presence standard impliedly requires merely that there
be some evidence that an out-of-state retailer is doing business within a
given state in order for the state to be able to impose collection responsi-
bilities upon that retailer. For example, in the instant case the Iowa
court found that the test was satisfied by two factors: (1) Good's Furni-
ture's television advertisements, although not specifically directed at
81. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
82. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 561; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312
U.S. 359, 364 (1941).
83. See generally Comment, Use Taxes on Interstate Sales-Mail Order Firms Freed From Col-
lecting Use Tax, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 520 (1968).
84. In a recent law review article it is posited that the concept of an economic or business
presence nexus is more in tune with the realities of modern commercial operations than a physical
presence nexus. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV.
265, 286. Similarly, another commentator recommended that nexus in use tax cases be based on the
amount of sales revenues received by a foreign vendor from sales in the forum state. Simet, The
Concept of "Nexus" and State Use and Unapportioned Gross Receipts Taxes, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 112,
133 (1978).
85. For the court's discussion of Scripto and National Geographic Soc'y., see Good's Furniture,
382 N.W.2d at 150.
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Iowa customers, reached residents in that state,8 6 and (2) Good's Furni-
ture delivered merchandise to Iowa residents in its own trucks, with its
own employees.8 7 Mere business presence, however, expands use tax ju-
risdiction beyond any limits approved by the Supreme Court.
The absence of such approbation is understandable, since the busi-
ness presence standard fails to meet the requirements imposed by the
commerce and due process clauses. Since advertising is sufficient to sus-
tain a business presence nexus, the out-of-state retailer need have no
property or solicitors in the forum state. Therefore, the factual minima
required to satisfy constitutional requirements become much more nebu-
lous. For example, to satisfy the due process "benefit test,"88 one com-
mentator posited that out-of-state retailers receive a benefit through
consumer protection and usury laws on mail order transactions. These
laws, according to that commentary, create consumer confidence, which
is critically important to interstate sales.8 9 Any benefit accruing to an
out-of-state retailer, and based on consumer confidence, would be impos-
sible to measure. In contrast, it is relatively easy to measure benefits
accruing to out-of-state retailers as a result of having property or solici-
tors in the taxing state.
Significantly, the Court, faced with an opportunity to adopt a busi-
ness presence standard on several occasions, has indicated a clear reluc-
tance to expand its well-established physical presence nexus standard. In
Miller Brothers, the Court characterized the difference between a busi-
ness presence and a physical presence standard as representing a "wide
gulf."90 There, the Court refused to allow Maryland to impose tax collec-
tion liabilities upon an extra-state border retailer that had no contacts
with the taxing state, other than the incidental effects of general advertis-
ing and occasional deliveries via company-owned truck.9'
86. Good's Furniture's occasional advertising via a Davenport, Iowa television station was not
dispositive of the nexus issue because the company's ads were not specifically geared towards Iowa
customers. Rather, the Iowa station was used for economic reasons. As explained in Appellant's
Brief at 4, Good's Furniture's location in Kewanee was bracketed between television markets in
Peoria, Illinois and the Quad Cities area (Moline and Rock Island, Illinois and Davenport and Bet-
tendorf, Iowa). One of three television stations in the Quad Cities area was located in Davenport.
Good's Furniture purchased the most economical advertising in each of its markets and, based on
price, sometimes advertised through the Davenport station. Id. This very situation highlights one of
the many problems that results from using advertising as a basis for establishing a use tax jurisdic-
tion nexus. See discussion, infra, at notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
87. Good's Furniture, 382 N.W.2d at 150.
88. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444.
89. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess. Due Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 265,
285.
90. Miller Bros., 340 U.S. at 347.
91. Id.
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Similarly, in National Bellas Hess the Court refused to "obliterate"
the distinction between a business presence and a physical presence stan-
dard; a standard which, up until that time, had been generally recognized
by state taxing authorities. 92 Finally, in National Geographic Society,
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, refused to accept California's
"slightest presence" standard. 93
Thus, based on Miller Brothers, where the extra-territorial seller's
only contacts with the taxing state were the incidental effects of general
advertising and occasional deliveries via company-owned truck-in brief,
a business presence-precedent clearly dictated a decision in favor of the
retailer-taxpayer in Good's Furniture. It is obvious that the factual set-
ting in the Iowa case presented the state supreme court with a situation
completely analogous to that presented in Miller Brothers. Any mean-
ingful attempt to distinguish the two cases would not have enabled the
Iowa court to reach a result opposite to that reached in Miller Brothers.
A decision in favor of Good's Furniture is made even more compelling
by the Supreme Court's steadfast refusal to depart from its physical pres-
ence standard for imposition of use tax collection liabilities on out-of-
state sellers.
Furthermore, the business presence standard is unworkable because
it imposes use tax collection duties on border store retailers, such as
Good's Furniture, that engage in only incidental advertising in another
taxing jurisdiction and, as a result, must respond to the needs of custom-
ers who choose to cross jurisdictional boundaries to make purchases. 94
There can be no doubt that in-state solicitation of sales through solicitors
or independent contractors provides a sufficient nexus for imposition of
tax collection duties.95 While some courts and commentators argue,
however, that a realistic approach to retail business practices compels the
conclusion that systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of a
92. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
93. National Geographic Soc'y., 430 U.S. at 556. Based on its interpretation of relevant
Supreme Court decisions, the California Supreme Court concluded that the slightest presence of a
seller in California established the requisite nexus to support imposition of use tax collection respon-
sibilities. National Geographic Soc'y. v. California Bd. of Equalization, 16 Cal. 3d 637, 644, 128
Cal. Rptr. 682, 686, 547 P.2d 458, 462 (1977).
94. In cases decided since Miller Brothers, the Court has repeatedly recognized that the border
store situation is clearly distinguishable from the situations where use tax collection liability had
been upheld. In Scripto, 362 U.S. at 212i the Court stated that "on the contrary, the goods on which
Maryland sought to force Miller [in Miller Brothers] to collect its tax were sold to residents of
Maryland when personally present at Miller's store in Delaware ... Marylanders went to Delaware
to make purchases-Miller did not go to Maryland for sales." See also, National Geographic Soc'y.,
430 U.S. at 559.
95. See, e.g., Scripto, 362 U.S. at 207; General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 332 U.S. 335
(1944).
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market through advertising should be sufficient to satisfy constitutional
nexus requirements, 96 this assertion loses its effect when the border store
retailing situation is considered. In most cases, where a retail location is
close to a taxing border its advertisements inevitably cross the boundary.
Rhetorically speaking: How is it that an out-of-state retailer can control
television advertisements that are beamed across another state's borders?
Indeed, the problem is more than a border store problem. The exist-
ence of satellite television stations and cable television, as well as national
magazines and newspapers make a business presence, through advertis-
ing, an unworkable basis upon which to establish use tax collection juris-
dictional nexus. Such a standard, as that established by the Good's
Furniture court, means that any retailers advertising in nationwide media
could be deputized as state tax collectors in any and all states. Compli-
ance costs in such a situation would most assuredly contravene settled
constitutional limitations upon use tax collection jurisdiction. 97  The
Supreme Court, with good reason, has expressly excluded "incidental"
advertising from the nexus equation.98  Indeed, the Court has implied
that any media advertising, whether it is incidental or direct, across state
boundaries will be insufficient to pass a nexus test. 99
C. Effect of the Good's Furniture Decision
The effect of the Good's Furniture decision, aggregated with similar
recent decisions in other state courts' 0 is that the physical presence
nexus standard is steadily being eroded. 10 1 In its place, a standard is
96. See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 761-62 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Advertising
could, conceivably, satisfy a due process challenge by reasoning that the in-state solicitation yields
the "benefit" of increased sales for the out-of-state retailer. However, the approach would still fail a
commerce clause attack because without a physical presence, the compliance burden on the extra-
territorial seller would outweigh the state's need to impose use tax jurisdiction.
97. See the discussion supra note 48 and accompanying text.
98. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
99. Notably, the National Bellas Hess Court did not characterize the Miller Brothers advertis-
ing as "incidental," but rather, described the advertising in direct terms. The Court even mentioned
that "substantial sales" had been made by Miller Brothers in Maryland, as a result of advertising.
Nonetheless, the National Rellas Hess Court reaffirmed the Miller Bros. holding. National Bellas
Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
100. See supra note 61.
101. However, one state court recently refused to follow the trend in expanding state use tax
jurisdiction. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Commonwealth Dep't. of Revenue, 516 A.2d 820 (1986). In that
case, L.L. Bean, a mail order seller domiciled in Maine, delivered its merchandise via common
carrier into Pennsylvania. L.L. Bean's catalogs were distributed through the mail and were adver-
tised in magazines and newspapers that reached Pennsylvania residents. Additionally, the company
maintained an "800" telephone number which out-of-state residents used to place orders. Id. at 882.
The Department of Revenue determined that these activities constituted a sufficient nexus for impo-
sition of use tax collection responsibilities. The Department argued that the trend in finding the
requisite nexus had "moved from the initial requirement of physical property in the state to ... the
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emerging that is neither workable nor compatible with constitutional
limitations. Understandably, states are taking independent action to pro-
tect erosion of state revenues. 0 2 These actions stem from an inability to
reach mail order and border store retailers as a result of the physical
presence test for nexus, and the perceived loss of revenues therefrom. 103
Expedience, from the states' perspective, cannot override constitutional
concerns, however. °4
The Supreme Court has demonstrated, in recent years, a reluctance
to address the use tax collection jurisdiction issue further by indicating
that jurisdictional questions are properly within the legislative domain of
Congress. 0 5 Moreover, litigation would be a slow and costly process in
which many possible criteria for nexus would have to be tested, perhaps
one at a time, before establishing a clear definition of the standard. 10 6
Where the collection of a tax is not compatible with constitutional
protections, it cannot be made compatible through independent state ac-
tions.' 0 7 Consequently, unless Congress acts to modify the nexus stan-
dards, balancing both the interest of the state tax administrators with the
interests of the out-of-state retailers, the constitutional safeguards must
prevail. 108
consideration of the 'totality of business activities in a certain state.' " Id. at 825. The court declined
to accept the business presence standard; it concluded that L.L. Bean's contacts with Pennsylvania
were less substantial than those in Miller Bros. Thus, imposition of use tax collection duties on this
out-of-state mail order company would contravene due process and commerce clause limitations.
Id. at 825-26.
102. For example, states are forming compacts to reduce use tax advoidance on retail sales made
by extra-territorial retailers in one state, but received by a customer in the market state. Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have entered into the Great Lakes Interstate Sales
Compact (Wisconsin subsequently withdrew from the Compact, by Executive Order of the Gover-
nor, on August 31, 1987). Similarly, Pennsylvania, New York and Ohio have entered into such
agreements. States are also attempting state legislative enactments to expand nexus requirements for
use tax jurisdiction. See supra note 12.
103. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
104. As the Supreme Court noted in J.C Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444: "[T]he limits on the
otherwise autonomous powers of the states are those in the Constitution."
105. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1977) and National Bellas Hess, 386
U.S. at 760 ("Under the Constitution this is a domain where Congress alone has the power of regula-
tion and control.").
106. ACIR, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF OUT-OF-STATE MAIL ORDER SALES 82 (April
1986).
107. Governor James Thompson made this very point when he vetoed the Illinois legislators'
attempt to expand Illinois' use tax jurisdiction in S.B. 2037, Laws 1986. The Governor stated that
"[A]lthough the goal of Senate Bill 2037 is laudable, this goal must be met through federal action to
overturn . . . previous U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Attempts of a single state ... to legislate an
issue which can only be legislated by Congress will result in further constitutional challenges and
litigation . . ." Governor James R. Thompson of Illinois, Veto Message. S.B. 2037, Laws 1986
(September 18, 1986).
108. Two bills were recently introduced in Congress that, if enacted, will relax the nexus stan-
dards for imposition of tax collection jurisdiction. One bill, the Equity in Interstate Competition Act
of 1987, H.R. 1891, will permit a state to tax interstate sales if(l) the sale was destined for the taxing
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CONCLUSION
The factual setting in Good's Furniture presented the Iowa Supreme
Court with a situation completely analogous to that presented in Miller
Brothers. Also, except for some local advertising and deliveries via com-
pany-owned truck, the situation in Good's Furniture was similar to that
addressed by the Supreme Court in National Bellas Hess. Both of those
cases should have dictated the outcome in the instant case.
Instead, to reach the opposite result, the Good's Furniture court
adopted a business presence standard, predicated on advertising and de-
livery connections, both of which had been previously rejected by the
Supreme Court as bases for imposing use tax collection responsibilities
on out-of-state retailers. The Iowa Supreme Court exceeded the settled
limitations upon use tax collection jurisdiction as enumerated in a consis-
tent line of Supreme Court decisions. Under the physical presence stan-
dard established by the Court, which is still valid today, the presence of a
retail store, property, or solicitors is needed to satisfy constitutional
requirements.
Further, the Good's Furniture court gave tacit approval to a discon-
certing trend which has developed in recent years. Namely, state at-
tempts to expand use tax jurisdiction (and, correspondingly, revenues) by
passing seemingly unconstitutional statutes relying on a business pres-
ence standard. Arguably, advertising technological innovations require a
use tax jurisdictional standard less restrictive than the current physical
presence standard. However, only Congress can exercise its broad pow-
ers to regulate commerce, and modify the use tax nexus standards.
CHRIS M. AMANTEA
state, (2) the seller engaged in regular or systematic soliciting of sales in such state, and (3) the seller
had gross receipts from sales in the United States exceeding $12,500,000, or $500,000 in the taxing
state in a one year period. H.R. 1891, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987) (The provisions of this bill
are essentially the same as those in H.R. 5021, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1986), which died in the
House Judiciary Committee.).
Another bill introduced in the House of Representatives, the Interstate Sales Tax Collection
Act of 1987, H.R. 1242, will allow any state to collect sales or use tax on tangible personal property
shipped or delivered into the taxing state by a retailer engaged in business in the taxing state. A
"retailer engaged in business" includes any retailer soliciting orders for tangible personal property by
means of advertising in the taxing state. Also included are out-of-state vendors utilizing "substantial
and recurring" mail solicitations in the taxing state, provided certain enumerated in-state benefits are
realized by the vendor. To fall within the Act's provisions, a retailer's nationwide gross sales of
tangible personal property must exceed $5,000,000 annually. H.R. 1242, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1987).
Both pieces of legislation implicitly recognize the burden of high compliance costs on small
retailers by adopting a de minimis sales provision. Note that even under federal legislation, Good's
Furniture would not have been subject to Iowa's use tax collection jurisdiction.
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